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Abstract 
This paper describes a risk model for estimating the likelihood of collisions at low-exposure railway level crossings, demonstrating 
the effect that differences in safety integrity can have on the likelihood of a collision. The model facilitates the comparison of safety 
benefits between level crossings with passive controls (stop or give-way signs) and level crossings that have been hypothetically 
upgraded with conventional or low-cost warning devices. The scenario presented illustrates how treatment of a cross-section of level 
crossings with low cost devices can provide a greater safety benefit compared to treatment with conventional warning devices for 
the same budget. 
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Introduction 
Collisions between road and rail vehicles account for 
approximately 30% of rail related fatalities in Australia 
(excluding suicides) according to the Independent 
Transport Safety Regulator in New South Wales [1]. In 
the 10-year period between 2000 and 2009, 
approximately 44.9% of collisions occurred at level 
crossings with passive controls (crossings with stop or 
give-way signs) and 55.1% at level crossings with 
flashing lights or boom barriers [1]. Of the 695 
collisions that occurred over this 10-year period, 
approximately 13% occurred at private level crossings.  
Collectively, level crossings with passive controls 
continue to represent a significant safety concern for 
Australia. There are in excess of 5,900 public level 
crossings and as many as 13,000 private and 
occupational crossings of this type in Australia 
according to the Railway Industry Safety and Standards 
Board [2]. The potential for high-consequence accidents 
with multiple fatalities at these crossings and the high 
cost of collisions to society and the rail industry has 
made the issue of improving safety at these crossings a 
high priority. 
Low-cost level crossing warning devices have the 
potential to provide railways with an additional control 
for risk at low-exposure level crossings, allowing more 
of these crossings to be upgraded with the same capital 
investment required when compared with the cost of 
installing a conventional active warning system. As 
more level crossings can be treated for a given 
investment, safety benefits associated with active 
warning device installations are obtained in a shorter 
time frame thus improving safety of the network at a 
significantly faster rate. This concept was discussed 
earlier by Wullems and Nikandros in [3], whereby the 
reduction in cost was associated with the use of devices 
with a reduced level of safety integrity. 
Low-cost warning devices are typically 
characterised by the use of alternative rail vehicle 
detection technologies, wireless connectivity and the 
use of solar power in an effort to reduce installation, 
equipment and maintenance costs. The cost associated 
with meeting the same safety requirements as warning 
devices deployed at high-risk urban crossings, however, 
is an obstacle to facilitating significant cost reductions. 
For this reason, an approach is being investigated where 
the safety integrity of warning devices is at least 
commensurate to the level of risk reduction required to 
meet tolerable hazard rates. This means that for lower-
risk level crossings (i.e. lower rail and road traffic 
volumes), the magnitude of risk reduction required is 
less than that required for higher-risk crossings. 
Wullems in [4] discusses issues in reducing the costs of 
level crossing warning devices and the trial of such 
devices being facilitated by the Cooperative Research 
Centre for Rail Innovation. 
This paper describes a risk model for estimating the 
likelihood of collisions at low exposure crossings with 
different types of warning devices. The model takes into 
account the safety integrity of warning devices and 
allows the comparison of conventional and low-cost 
warning devices with standard road interfaces for level 
crossings as defined in Australian Standard AS1742.7 
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[5]. The model is used to compare the safety benefits in 
terms of monetary value of mitigated safety lost with 
the costs of upgrading a cross-section of low-exposure 
level crossings with passive controls to active warnings 
(flashing lights warning of an approaching rail vehicle) 
using low-cost warning devices. 
This work is being conducted as part of a tranche of 
level crossings safety projects being facilitated by the 
Cooperative Research Centre for Rail Innovation (Rail 
CRC) and the Australian rail industry, and is a 
fundamental part of the strategy underpinning the future 
adoption of low-cost level crossing warning devices in 
Australia. These projects include a national, multi-
jurisdictional trial of low-cost level crossings warning 
devices and the development of a risk argument, 
procurement of legal advice and development of a 
decision-making framework to support their adoption in 
a manner consistent with duty of care obligations of 
railways.  
 
Low-cost level crossings 
Low-cost level crossing warning devices (LCLCWDs) 
are functionally equivalent to existing level crossing 
warning devices. For a single track crossing, the 
warning devices must activate a flashing signals (RX5 
assembly) a minimum of 20 seconds prior to the arrival 
of a train as defined in Australian standard 
AS1742.7[5]. It is further noted by the standard that 
greater periods may be required at multiple track 
crossings or where some railway organizations require 
longer times (e.g. to provide sufficient warning time 
where B-Doubles and B-Triples use the level crossing). 
The road user interface of LCLCWDs must also comply 
with AS1742.7, such that LCLCWDs are 
indistinguishable to the road user from a conventional 
level crossing warning device. Note that LCLCWDs are 
not intended to be a replacement or substitute for 
existing warning devices at high-exposure crossings. 
The Rail CRC Affordable Level Crossing project 
steering committee (consisting of representation from 
the major Australian railways and departments of 
transportation) developed a set of nationally consistent 
principles for the deployment of LCLCWDs at low-
exposure level crossings with passive controls. The 
deployment profile targets level crossings with a single 
track, not within 25 seconds of multiple tracks (the 25 
seconds refers to timing for level crossings controlled 
with boom barriers) and with low rail and road vehicle 
volumes.  
As the road user interface of LCLCWDs is identical 
to conventional warning devices, comparison of safety 
risks at level crossings with LCLCWDs and those with 
conventional warning devices can be constrained to the 
underlying technology and does not need to consider 
human factors issues related to changing to the road 
interface. The model described in this paper provides a 
method for determining whether risks to safety at level 
crossings with passive warning devices are adequately 
reduced by using innovative active warning devices that 
have a lower level of safety integrity compared to 
conventional active warning devices. This work is 
intended to test the defensibility of the argument for 
LCLCWDs with a level of safety integrity at least 
commensurate with the magnitude of risk reduction 
required to meet tolerable hazard rates at low-exposure 
level crossings. This approach does not advocate the use 
of interventions without safety evidence and nonetheless 
requires suppliers of LCLCWDs to use good practice in 
relation to meeting safety assurance requirements. 
As part of the hierarchy of available 
countermeasures, LCLCWDs can have a key role to 
play in reducing risk at low-exposure level crossings. 
One of the key philosophies being explored is the 
utilization of cost-effective risk-appropriate 
countermeasures for level crossings in order to attain a 
higher safety outcome for the network per unit of capital 
expenditure on safety improvement.  
In addition to LCLCWD with technologies and 
designs intended to reduce installation and other 
lifecycle costs, the cost of level crossing warning 
devices is influenced by requirements for high levels of 
safety integrity (e.g. SIL4), as higher levels of safety 
integrity require more demanding, and therefore more 
expensive, development processes.  
At low-exposure level crossings, such requirements 
can result in excessive spending on a given safety 
countermeasure with respect to achieved risk reduction. 
By reducing safety integrity requirements of LCLCWDs 
to a level commensurate to the level of risk reduction 
required to meet tolerable hazard rates, the reduced cost 
would mean that such devices can be installed at more 
crossings, and therefore provide a significantly larger 
reduction of risk over the cross-section of crossings 
suitable for the deployment of LCLCWDs. 
This philosophy is in contrast to the current 
incremental upgrade approach, where expensive 
conventional active warning systems are incrementally 
installed at sites determined through risk-based 
prioritization. 
 
Models for evaluating level crossing risk 
The Independent Transport Safety Regulator (ITSR) 
of New South Wales conducted a study assessing level 
crossing crash modelling approaches from Australia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States [6]. This study 
considered approaches including the Australian Level 
Crossing Assessment Model (ALCAM), Stott theory 
[7], the Peabody Dimmick formula [8], the US 
Department of Transport formula for level crossing 
crash prediction [9] and the ITSR Logit formula [6] 
(based on a logistic regression of 10 years of crash 
data). The study found that the Peabody Dimmick was 
the model that best fit Australian historical crash data 
from the evaluated models, showing a very good 
correlation for active crossings, but a degree of over-
prediction for passive level crossings [6].  
The Peabody Dimmick accident prediction formula 
was first published in 1941 [8], based on 5 years of 
accident data from rural crossings in 29 states of the US 
[10]. The formula for determining the number of 
expected collisions in a 5-year period is as follows: 
 
A5 = Iu + K (1) 
Iu = 1.28 × (V0.170 × T0.151) / P0.171  
 
Where: A5 is the expected number of accidents in 5 
years; V is the annual average daily road traffic; T is the 
annual average rail traffic; P is the protection coefficient 
where P(Signs) = 19, P(Flashing Lights) = 147, 
P(Booms) = 333; and K is the additional parameter 
obtained from the smoothing factor curve illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Smoothing factor K 
 As the Peabody Dimmick model is based on 
accident data from 1941, collision rates predicted by the 
model are significantly higher due to the then higher 
collision rates. ITSR calculated adjustment factors by 
using a least squares fit of historical data curves, so that 
predicted collision likelihood matches actual crash rates 
in Australia [6]. The formulas for the Peabody Dimmick 
model with the adjustment factors determined by ITSR 
are detailed below. The annual frequency of collisions 
(CPD) for a given level crossing is given in equation 2, 
modified to include an adjustment factor (AF) for 
Australian crash rates for a given type of warning 
device (PT) 
	  
CPD = [AF(PT) × (Iu + K)] / 5 (2) 
	  
Where: Iu is the unbalanced accident factor, K is the 
smoothing factor, AF(Signs) = 1/33, AF(Flashing 
Lights) = 1/26 and AF(Booms) = 1/45. The unbalanced 
accident factor (Iu) is calculated as follows: 
	  
Iu = 1.28 × V0.170 × T0.151 / P(PT)0.171 (3) 
	  
Where: P(PT) is the warning device coefficient for a 
given protection type: P(Signs) = 19, P(Flashing 
Lights) = 147, P(Booms) = 333; V is the daily average 
number of road vehicles that traverse the crossing; and 
T is the daily average number of rail vehicles that 
traverse the crossing. 
We were unable to obtain the original publication of 
the Peabody-Dimmick model [8] and the equation for 
the smoothing factor K, was not provided in subsequent 
republications of the model [10]. As such, the 
smoothing factor curve has been estimated from the 
original graph using polynomial regression. The 
following polynomial has an r2 of 0.9998: 
 
K = -0.0329 × Iu5 + 0.3996 × Iu4 – 1.604 × Iu3 + (4) 
 2.9503 × Iu2 – 2.891 × Iu + 0.6549  
 
Where:  Iu ≥ 0.5 and Iu ≤ 5.0. The smoothing factor 
(K) is only valid for values of Iu greater or equal to 0.5 
and less than or equal to 5.0, as this was the extent of 
the original curve available for the polynomial 
regression.  
 
Low-cost level crossing risk model 
The proposed low-cost level crossing risk model 
provides an estimate of mitigated collisions and 
monetary value of mitigated safety loss for a level 
crossing site treated with a LCLCWD. The model is 
comprised of a collision likelihood model and a model 
that estimates the frequency of collisions due to wrong 
side failures.  
Wrong side failures are conditions that result in a 
state that is less safe than had the failure not existed. 
Failures that result in the loss of the safety function (i.e. 
failure to provide timely warning to road users of an 
approaching rail vehicle) are considered wrong side 
failures. Such failures include failure to detect an 
approaching rail vehicle, failure of primary and backup 
level crossing power supplies, and failure of multiple 
flashing lights. These failures do not result in the system 
entering a technically safe state. 
The absence of a rail vehicle approach warning is 
interpreted by the road user as an indication that it is 
safe to traverse the crossing. Unlike passive level 
crossings, where road users are required to look for rail 
vehicles in order to determine whether it is safe to 
traverse, if the crossing has active warning devices, road 
users tend to rely on the warning rather than looking for 
approaching rail vehicles. Typically, active warning 
devices are installed at level crossings that have 
inherently higher safety risk, such as level crossings 
with reduced sighting time of an approaching rail 
vehicle. As a result, a wrong side failure of a level 
crossing warning device is a dangerous failure with 
potentially catastrophic consequences. 
The model, which is illustrated in Figure 2, 
calculates the effective risk reduction in terms of 
mitigated collisions for level crossings upgraded with 
LCLCWDs. The estimated frequency of mitigated 
collisions is calculated as follows: 
 
F(Mitigated-Collisions) = F(Collisions,Signs) –   
 F(Collisions, LCLCWD) (5) 
F(Collisions, Signs) = CPD(Signs)  
F(Collisions, LCLCWD) = CPD(FlashL) + 
 [F(Collisions|WSF,LCLCWD) –  
 F(Collisions|WSF,Conv)] 
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Where: F(Collisions, PT) is the estimated frequency 
of collisions for a level crossing with a given type of 
warning device PT; CPD(PT) is the estimated frequency 
of collisions calculated from the modified Peabody 
Dimmick model for a given type of warning device PT; 
and F(Collisions|WSF,AWD) is the estimated frequency 
of collisions due to wrong side failure of a given active 
warning device AWD, calculated from the wrong side 
failure event tree model.  
The modified Peabody Dimmick model is used to 
estimate the collision frequency pre and post upgrade, 
providing an estimate of the number of collisions 
mitigated by upgrading a previously passive crossing 
with a conventional active warning.  
The additional collision risk due to the lower safety 
integrity of LCLCWDs is calculated as the difference of 
the estimated number of collisions due to wrong-side 
failure for a conventional warning device and a 
LCLCWD. It is assumed that collisions caused by 
wrong-side failures of conventional active warning 
devices (current safety performance), are included in the 
Peabody Dimmick collision frequency estimation due to 
its good correlation with Australian crash data.  
The estimated frequency of mitigated collisions can 
then used to perform cost-benefit analysis, using an 
economic model to determine the monetary value of 
mitigated collisions. 
Collision due to wrong side failure likelihood model 
This model is used to estimate the likelihood of a 
collision due to wrong side failure of the level crossing 
warning device. The model considers two collision 
scenarios at a level crossing: a rail to road vehicle 
collision, where the road vehicle is traversing the level 
crossing and the rail vehicle collides with the road user; 
and a road to rail vehicle collision, where the rail 
vehicle is traversing the level crossing and the road 
vehicle collides with the rail vehicle. These scenarios 
define the possible consequences of a warning device in 
a state of wrong side failure (the initiating event) and 
are illustrated in the event tree (Figure 3). It is assumed 
that if the active level crossing warning device suffered 
a wrong side failure and that the road user is already 
traversing the level crossing, the road user will be 
unable to take emergency action to avoid the rail 
vehicle. Examples of calculations for quantifying event 
tree parameters are provided below. 
The average frequency of wrong side failure per day 
for a level crossing warning device, w, can be calculated 
as the probability of failure per hour (PFH) × 24, where 
dangerous failures included in the PFH calculation are 
those that lead directly to loss of the safety function, i.e. 
to warn road users of an approaching train. 
The probability ELX(RailV) can be calculated using 
the road user occupation time (the same number of 
seconds of approach of the rail vehicle into the crossing 
for the rail vehicle to road vehicle collision window), 
where the approach time is the number of rail vehicles 
per day (T) multiplied by the time the road user 
occupies the crossing in seconds, divided by the number 
of seconds per day.  
 
ELX(RailV) = [T × time(LXOccByRoadV)] /  (6) 
 (24 × 60 × 60) 
The probability of the rail vehicle traversing the 
level crossing, TLX(RoadV), can be calculated by the 
number of vehicles per day (V) multiplied by the 
average time in seconds, divided by the number of 
seconds per day the level crossing is occupied by road 
users. 
 
TLX(RoadV) = (V × timeLXOccByRoadV) /  (7) 
 (24 × 60 × 60) 
 
Road user occupation time is the time road users 
take to traverse level crossing without stopping. It is 
assumed the road users will not stop at the level 
crossing to look for rail vehicles if the level crossing has 
 
 
Figure 2. Low-cost level crossing risk model 
active warning devices. The calculation below is for 
level crossings with a single track. 
timeLXOccByRoadV  = [(2 × dangerZoneDist) +  (8) 
 gaugeWidth + roadVLength)] /  
 roadVSpeed 
 = [(2 ×3) + 1.6 + 6.55] / 11.11 
 = 1.274 seconds 
 
Where: dangerZoneDist is the distance from the rail 
considered the danger zone (3 meters); gaugeWidth is 
the width of the railway gauge (1.6 meters for 
Australian broad gauge); roadVLength is the average 
road vehicle length (6.55m is obtained from 10% of B-
double traffic with a length of 25 meters and 90% of 
traffic with an average vehicle length of 4.5 meters); 
and the roadVSpeed is the average speed of road 
vehicles at the crossing in meters per second (40 km/h). 
The probability that the rail vehicle is traversing the 
level crossing, TLX(RailV), can be calculated as the 
number of rail vehicles per day (T) multiplied by the 
time the train occupies the crossing in seconds, divided 
by the number of seconds per day. 
 
TLX(RailV) = (T × timeLXOccByRailV) /  (9) 
 (24 × 60 × 60)  
 
Where: timeLXOccByRailV can be calculated by the 
average rail vehicle length in meters divided by the 
average rail vehicle speed in meters per second. The 
following calculation is based on a maximum freight 
train length of 1800 meters (where Parkes-Perth-
Adelaide-Darwin lines are limited by 1800m crossing 
loops and Adelaide-Melbourne-Sydney-Brisbane lines 
are limited by 1500m crossing loops, some extended to 
1800m), and an average crossing traversal speed of 80 
km/h. Note that coal trains in some jurisdictions can be 
longer than 1800m (e.g. RioTinto operates trains of up 
to 2400m; BHP Billiton operates trains of up to 3000m). 
 
timeLXOccByRailV = (railVLength /  (10) 
 railVSpeed)   
 = 1800 / 22.222 = 81.407 seconds 
 
The probability of the road vehicle approaching the 
level crossing, ALX(RoadV), can be calculated as the 
number of road vehicles per day (V) multiplied by the 
time a road vehicle is approaching the level crossing in 
seconds, divided by the number of seconds per day. 
 
ALX(RoadV) = (V × timeRoadVApprLX)) /  (11) 
 (24 × 60 × 60)  
 
Where timeRoadVApprLX can be calculated as 
follows: 
 
timeRoadVApprLX = roadVDecelerationTime)  (12) 
 + reactionTime + brakeDelayTime  
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Figure 3. Event tree for consequences of wrong-side failure 
Rearranging the following formula, the time 
required for a B-double to come to a stop before the 
level crossings can be calculated: 
 
 a = (v0 – vt) / t (13)  
 
Where: a is acceleration; v0 is the initial velocity, vt 
is the velocity at time t; and t is the time in seconds. For 
a B-double truck with a gross combined mass of 60 
tonne and an initial velocity of 80 km/h (22.222 m/s), 
the average deceleration is assumed to be 0.31g (3.041 
m/s2) [11]. The road user reaction time for braking 
under normal conditions is estimated to be 0.4 seconds 
[12]. 
 
timeRoadVApprLX = (22.222 / 3.041) +  (14) 
 0.4 + 1.0 = 8.708 seconds  
 
For an average road vehicle, average deceleration is 
assumed to be 3.4 m/s [12] resulting in an approach 
time of 7.936 seconds. An average value of 8.013 
seconds is used based on a traffic apportionment of 10% 
B-doubles and 90% average vehicles.  
 
The probability the road user notices the level 
crossing is occupied and makes a controlled stop, 
RUP(LXOcc), can be based on the probability the road 
user is able to see the rail vehicle. If there is a wrong 
side failure in low visibility conditions and no sidelights 
on rail vehicle wagons, it can be assumed the road user 
will not notice the crossing is occupied until it is too late 
to take successful emergency action. However, in good 
visibility (daylight) conditions, it is assumed that a road 
user will notice the crossing is already occupied and 
stop or take emergency action to avoid the rail vehicle.  
Based on the assumption that low visibility 
conditions will occur on average between the hours of 
17:00 and 07:00,  
 
RUP(LXOcc) = 1-(14 / 24) = 0.417 (15) 
 
The probability the road user takes successful 
emergency action to avoid the road vehicle, REA, is 
assigned a value of 0. It is assumed that if the level 
crossing suffered a wrong side failure and that the road 
user does not notice the crossing is occupied or notices 
too late to make a controlled stop, it is unlikely the road 
user will be able to take successful emergency action. 
This assumption has been made to err on the side of 
safety in the absence of valid data qualifying this event. 
The event tree in Figure 3 can be reduced to the 
following equation in order to calculate, the frequency 
of collisions due to wrong side failure of level crossing 
equipment: 
 
F(Collision|WSF) = [w × ELX(RoadV) × (16) 
 TLX(RoadV)] + [w × TLX(RailV) ×  
 ALX(RoadV) × (1 - RUP(LXOcc)) × 
 (1 – REA))] 
 
This model estimates the frequency of collisions due 
to wrong side failure, however, there is the assumption 
that the failure will be subsequently detected and 
reported to the network controller, i.e. that the wrong 
side failure will not persist past the first traversal of the 
level crossing by a rail vehicle. Depending on the type 
of wrong side failure, the monitoring systems in place 
and the rules and operating procedures in relation to 
level crossing failures, this assumption may not be 
valid.  
In some jurisdictions, remote monitoring of a 
heartbeat facilitates detection of some types of wrong 
side failure (e.g. failure of power system). Failure to 
detect a rail vehicle (e.g. failure to shunt) can be 
determined by comparing detected rail vehicles with the 
schedule. Some jurisdictions additionally have healthy 
state indicators on level crossing equipment, or side 
lights indicating the correct functioning of the warning 
device. According to the draft Australian National Rules 
and Procedures (ANRP) [13], the following procedures 
are to be followed with respect to potentially faulty and 
faulty level crossings: 
“If an active control level crossing is potentially 
faulty, Network Control Officers must warn rail 
traffic crews. Rail traffic crews warned about a 
potentially faulty level crossing must approach the 
crossing at a speed that allows rail traffic to stop 
short of the crossing. If it cannot be determined that 
the level crossing equipment is working correctly, rail 
traffic must: (1) stop short of the level crossing to 
check whether the warning equipment is operating 
correctly, and (2) if warning equipment is operating 
correctly, proceed, or (3) of warning equipment is not 
operating correctly, treat the level crossing as faulty, 
and (4) as soon as possible, report the condition of 
the warning equipment to the Network Control 
Officer.” 
“If an active level crossing is faulty, the Network 
Control Officer must: (1) warn rail traffic crews that 
the warning equipment is faulty, and (2) as necessary, 
arrange for a Competent Worker, emergency services 
or Road Traffic Controllers to protect the level 
crossing, or (3) arrange to close the crossing to road 
and pedestrian traffic, and (4) arrange for a Signals 
Maintenance Representative to attend, and (5) make a 
permanent record of the details.” 
 
Economic Model and Benefit Cost Analysis 
In order to estimate the monetary value of mitigated 
safety loss, the following parameters are required: a 
monetary value for preventing a fatality (VPF); costs 
per collision (CPC) other than human costs (e.g. delays, 
damage to rail infrastructure, damage to road vehicle, 
insurance, safety investigation, police and emergency 
services, etc.); and the person equivalent fatalities (PEF) 
per collision. 
The Railway Industry Safety and Standards Board 
engaged the Law and Economics Consulting Group 
(LECG) to develop a model to estimate the economic 
costs of railway level crossing incidents (excluding 
suicides) [14]. The value for preventing a fatality (VPF) 
in 2010 dollars at a non-urban level crossing was 
estimated to be $6,287,873 and the costs per collision 
(other than human costs) were estimated to be 
$152,467.30. A PEF ratio was calculated based on a 
summary of collisions and fatalities in Australia 
between 2000 and 2009 [1]. This figure is comprised 
only of fatalities, as we were unable to obtain reliable 
data on major or minor injuries. There were 695 
collisions during this period with 97 fatalities, resulting 
in the following PEF value: 
 
PEF= 97 / 695 = 0.140 per collision (17) 
 
The monetary value of mitigated safety loss 
(MVMSL) can be calculated as follows: 
 
MVMSL = (F(Mitigated Collisions) ×  (18) 
 PEF × VPF) + (F(Mitigated Collisions) ×  
 CPC)  
 
In order to analyse the costs and benefits over a 
given term for a cross section of candidate level 
crossings, the upgrade budget, capital expenditure, and 
operational expenditure are indexed to inflation. The 
indexation rate of the value for preventing a fatality 
(VPF) and discount rate of safety benefits have been set 
taking into account advice from the UK Treasury Green 
Book [15] in relation to discount rates for safety 
benefits: 
“It is considered that the value of preventing a 
fatality has a constant utility value over time and it is 
therefore uprated in real terms each year by real 
GDP per capita growth (i.e., currently, by about 2% 
per year, since at the moment the real per capita GDP 
growth is forecast at around 2% per annum). This 
uprating, coupled with a 3.5% discount rate, gives an 
effective discount rate for health and safety benefits of 
1.5% (lower effective discount rates apply to health 
and safety benefits accruing more than 30 years into 
the future). It needs to be noted that the real per 
capita GDP growth forecast could change over time.” 
 
An example scenario is illustrated below, where a 
cross-section of 100 level crossings that meet the 
deployment profile for LCLCWDs (average of 24 rail 
vehicles per day, 100 road vehicles per day) were 
considered with an upgrade budget of $3 million per 
annum (capital expenditure only). Railways are 
expected to manage the operational expenditure as part 
of railway operations. 
The probability of failure per hour (PFH) of the 
safety function “provide sufficient warning of 
approaching rail vehicles to road users” for existing 
warning systems is in the order of 1 × 10-7 / hour, based 
on performance data from some Australian railways. A 
tolerable hazard rate (THR) of 1 × 10-6 / hour (an order 
of 10 less than existing performance), is assumed in this 
scenario for the hazard "level crossing warning device 
does not provide adequate warning to road users of a 
rail vehicle approaching or traversing the level 
crossing". 
The estimated annual collision frequency for a level 
crossing with 24 rail vehicles per day and 100 road 
vehicles per day before treatment was 1.249 × 10-2 / 
annum. After installation of a LCLCWD (flashing lights 
only) the collision frequency was reduced to 8.655 × 
10-3 / annum, a 31% reduction in risk. Note that the 
magnitude of risk reduction would be significantly 
greater for level crossings with passive warning devices 
that had insufficient sighting.  
The reduction of safety integrity by an order of 
magnitude resulted in an increase of collision risk 
compared to existing warning devices of 4.795 × 10-7 
(collision frequency for conventional was 8.6545 × 10-3 
/ annum), a very small increase in risk given the 
potential benefit. 
Based on lifecycle costing models derived from a 
sample of baseline conventional level crossings and 
LCLCWDs, level crossings fitted with conventional 
active warning devices have an installation and 
equipment cost of approximately $500,000 with an 
annual cost including operational expenses, preventative 
and corrective maintenance of $3,500 per annum. 
LCLCWDs have an installation and equipment cost of 
approximately $200,000 with an annual cost of $3,000. 
The indexation rate used was 3% based on the 
consumer-purchasing index (CPI). For VPF and safety 
benefits, an indexation rate of 2% reflecting the 
Australian economic growth outlook was used instead. 
The discount rate used in this example was 3%. The 
output of the model for this scenario is detailed in 
Table 1. Note that the disproportion factor relates to the 
factor of disproportion between the present value of 
costs and benefits. 
 Figure 4 illustrates cumulative safety benefits of 
LCLCWDs versus conventional warning devices. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the costs and benefits of 
LCLCWDs and conventional warning devices 
respectively. 
	  
Table 1. Model output summary for example scenario 
 Baseline WD LCLCWD 
Level crossings 
upgraded 
100 100 
Cumulative costs 
(present value AU$) 
$55,831,000 $26,495,000 
Cumulative safety 
benefits (present 
value AU$) 
$6,124,007 $8,031,176 
Net present value 
(AU$) 
-$49,706,933 -$18,463,824 
Benefit cost ratio 0.110 0.303 
Disproportion factor 9.117 3.299 
	  
The benefit cost analysis was conducted using a 
population treatment argument, where installation of 
increased numbers of LCLCWDs with respect to 
conventional warning devices, result in significantly 
larger annual accrual of safety benefits for LCLCWDs. 
It is worth noting that once all crossings have been 
treated, the differential safety benefit for all crossings at 
some point in the future would result in a greater safety 
benefit with conventional treatment, i.e. the 
conventional line in Figure 4 would converge with the 
LCLCWD line. The rate of convergence depends on the 
monetary value of the additional safety benefit with 
respect to the LCLCWDs, i.e. the benefit of the 
improvement in safety integrity – in this case, an order 
of 10.  
Low-cost Level Crossing Trials, Risk and Legal 
Evaluations 
The Rail CRC Affordable Level Crossings project is 
currently facilitating trials of candidate LCLCWDs at 
sites in several Australian jurisdictions. These trials are 
expected to collect data in a wide range of operating and 
environmental conditions over a period of 12 months, 
providing confidence that the candidate LCLCWDs are 
capable of performing as intended in the target contexts. 
Risk assessment work is being conducted in parallel 
to the trials as part of the suite of level crossing projects 
 
Figure 4. Cumulative safety benefits of LCLCWDs vs. conventional warning devices (present value) 
 
	  
Figure 5. Annual costs vs. benefits of LCLCWDs (present value) 
 
 
Figure 6. Annual costs vs. benefits for conventional warning devices (present value) 
 
Rail CRC is facilitating. The objective of the risk work 
is to determine the defensibility of an argument for 
LCLCWDs with a level of safety integrity at least 
commensurate to the risk at low-exposure level 
crossings. Previous obstacles impeding the adoption of 
LCLCWDs were related to the lack of safety evidence 
provided by suppliers of these systems. While in some 
cases previous trials may have been successful, the lack 
of safety evidence posed a significant issue for railways 
in meeting duty of care obligations under the Rail 
Safety Act. The approach being investigated involves 
setting safety targets for low-exposure level crossings 
(consistent with the LCLCWD deployment profile), 
determined through a risk assessment process. Suppliers 
would be required to provide evidence of functional and 
technical safety, quality management and safety 
management. The lower safety target does not preclude 
these assurance requirements. 
As part of the risk assessment work, an independent 
review and evaluation of the risk argument will be 
conducted. Legal advice will also be sought in relation 
to the potential legal implications for the Australian rail 
industry including issues of Tort liability and whether 
deployment of LCLCWDs would meet the intent of the 
Rail Safety Act in relation to the reduction of risk so far 
as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP). Based on the 
results of the evaluations and legal advice, a decision-
making framework for the adoption of LCLCWDs will 
be developed with a series of detailed case studies.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has described a risk model for estimating the 
likelihood of collisions at low-exposure railway level 
crossings. The model and its assumptions were 
discussed with example calculations provided for a 
worst-case scenario. The model was applied to an 
upgrade scenario for a cross section of level crossings, 
comparing the outcomes between upgrades with low-
cost and conventional warning devices. The model 
demonstrated a significantly larger annual safety benefit 
for low cost warning devices due to the increased 
numbers of upgrades compared to conventional devices 
with the same annual budget. The lower level of safety 
integrity of low cost warning devices did not 
significantly increase the safety risk compared to 
conventional warning devices and offered a significant 
improvement in cost. The paper concluded with an 
overview of the trials and associated work being 
conducted by the CRC for Rail Innovation. 
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